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NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT
DECISIONS.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

Title of executor to notes against testator.
A somewhat remarkable decision was arrived at in Hoffer's
Estate, etc.. 156 Pa. 473, which we overlooked at the time but
which deserves notice. This was an appeal by the guardian
of Thomas Minors from the decree of the Orphans' Court sustaining exceptions to the report of the auditor of the account of
the executor of Hoffer, deceased.
The auditor had refused to allow credit for two notes made
by decedent and payable to accountant. Both notes were
overdue at the date of the decedent's death. There was evidence
that the notes were in possession of accountant's wife immediately after decedent's death, and were handed over by her
to accountant.
Exceptions to the auditor's report were sustained by the
court (MCPHERSON, J., delivering the opinion) on the ground
that an executor, who is the payee of the note of his decedent,
which is overdue at the time of the decedent's death, must
show clearly that he held the note by a title hostile to that
of decedent, which he may do by showing that the note was
in the custody of his wife immediately after the decedent's
death.
This decision, which was accepted without comment by the
Supreme Court, practically amounts to this, that, although
fraud is never assumed but must be proved, an executor holding notes of a testator is presumed to have stolen them unless
he can prove that he was the holder at the time of"the death.
That he was once the, holder the paper proves, but payment
and subsequent theft are presumed though liable to be disproved.
When we turn to the authority on which this remarkable
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deduction is founded we find it was the case of a note signed
by a marksman, not witnessed and, therefore, without any
outward sign of inward validity, moreover its existence was
wholly inconsistent with proof of the holder's admissions
that he was not a creditor. (McMahon's Est., 132 Pa. 179.)
We have quite enough instances of. inverted reasoning
without adding more to the list, even though it may be but
a single dictum. That it could have entered into the mind
of the most suspicious to suggest such an argument is bad
enough; to have it accepted by a court is serious and deserves
notice.

RECENT CORPORATION CASES.

In 150 U. S. 371, there is reported a most interestingdecision upQn the limits of the doctrine that the capital stock
of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of debts.

Our readers will remember that in the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
R. & Rev. 175),

AND REVIEW for February, 1893 (32 Am. L.

we published an editorial review of some of the more important
decisions of the Federal Courts which bear upon this question.
In view of such considerations, as must suggest themselves to
every careful reader of these judicial utterances, we ventured
to give our adherence to the opinioli that the attributes of a
trust fund are in many respects wanting in the case of capital
stock, and that the. use of the term is not only not helpful,
but actually misleading. A propos of these comments (which
included a resum6 of an article on this subject from the pen of
R. C. MCMURTRIE, Esq.), it is interesting to examine the decision above referred to, Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co. In this case a trustee of a corporate mortgage had instituted
proceedings thereunder which resulted in a decree for the
foreclosure of the mortgage deed and a sale of the property.
Sometime after the \commencement of this suit, but before the
decree, Hollins and others filed a bill in the same court,
making the corporation, the trustee, and sundry stock and
bond-holders, parties defendant. The plaintiffs were unsecured
creditors of the company, whose claims had accrued several
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years after the issue of the mortgage bonds; and, after stating
their claims, they alleged that the mortgage conveyance was
absolutely void, and that a large amount was still due on the
stock. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver and for
the sale of the property in satisfaction of their claims, and they
asked that the receiver be given authority to collect the unpaid
stock subscriptions for their benefit. They alleged the pendency of the trustee's suit, but did not ask to intervene. The
bill was dismissed upon the merits. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court, in an interesting opinion by Mr. Justice BREWER,
sustained the decision of the court below in dismissing the bill,
but decided that it should have been dismissed, not upon the
merits, but for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice BROWN and
Mr. Justice JACKSON dissented, but gave no reasons for their
dissent. Mr. ALEXANDER T. LONDON, for the appellants,
strenuously contended that unsecured creditors of a corporation have a right to proceed in equity, without first reducing
their claims to judgment at law. He relied upon the general
principle recognized in Case v. Beauregard (ioi U. S. 688),
that whenever a creditor has a trust in his favor or a lien upon
property for a debt due him, he may go into equity without
exhausting his legal remedies. He then claimed the.benefit of
the many decisions to the effect that the capital stock of a
corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors and
insisted that it is a necessary conclusion from these premises
that a corporate creditor, without judgment, may come into a
court of equity upon the insolvency of the corporation to
protect the trust fund and to enforce his lien. He also cited
expressions of judicial opinion that such a course is in strict
accordance with principle and quoted the language of Mr.
Chief Justice WAITE in Terry v. Anderson (95 U. S. 628).
The argument upon these grounds is conceived to be formally valid, and the conclusion follows from the prerpises as a
matter of logical necessity. As the conclusion, however, was
too preposterous to be accepted, and since the major premise
contained a statement of law which was indisputable, the court
was compelled either to deny the validity of the syllogism as
a mode of inference or else to deny a distinctive attribute of a
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trust fund to the capital stock of a corporation. Fortunately
the court adopted the latter alternative, as appears from the
following quotation :---While it is true language has been
frequently used to the effect that the assets of a corporation
are a trust fund, held by a corporation for the benefit of creditors, this has not been to convey the idea that there is a direct
and- express trust attached to the property. As said in
2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1046, they 'are not in
any true and complete sense trusts, and can only be called so
by way of analogy or metaphor.'"
In other words, this decision denies the necessary validity
of deductive arguments based upon the postulate of the trust
fund. In a science where analogy is out of place and metaphor is misleading, such a decision is in effect a judicial de,claration that the so called trust fund is not a trust fund at all.

LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW.

In the case of Shermer v. Paciello, 34 W. N. C. p. 252, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania passed upon the important
question of the right of a sub-tenant to resist proceedings in
ejectment instituted by virtue'of an authority contained in the
lease-the lease containing a prohibition against sub-letting.
It appeared that the plaintiff let certain premises to the defendant in August, i893. In October, 1893, the defendant called
at the office of the plaintiff's agent, handed him the keys, and
said that he had moved. When the agent went upon the
premises, he found Banner Herman in possession of a part of
the building and conducting a dry goods business for himself.
The lessor's agent, for the purpose of obtainihg possession, left
on the premises a notice to the defendant, the original lessor,
to give security within five days for three months' rent or
deliver possession. The notice fell into the hands of Herman,
who tendered the security, which was refused, and judgment
in ejectment was entered. Herman had been a sub-tenant for
some months, but of this neither the plaintiff or his agent had
any knowledge.
The question presented was to (I) the right of the sub-tenant
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to resist "he proceedings in ejectment instituted by virtue of
the lease, and (2) the right to enter security under the Act of
March 25, 1825, where the lessee has waived his rights under
that act. In the lower court, on the authority of the case of
Grider v. McIntyre, 6 Phila. I 12, judgment was given in favor
of the sub-tenant, who had obtained a rule to open the judgment in ejectment entered upon the.authority of the lease. In
the Supreme Court, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fell, it was
declared that the sub-tenant had no standing as against the
landlord under the circumstances of the case, unless he had
acquired some right, and judgment was given accordingly for
the plaintiff.
As early as the case of Row v. Riggs, Bos. & Pul. 330, Mansfield, C. J., declared: "I never understood that it was necessary
for a landlord to give notice to anyone but his own tenant. If
possession be not delivered up after said notice, the landlord
may take a verdict against his own tenant and sue at execution, upon which the sheriff will turn the under-tenants out of
possessibn." In Pennsylvania, however, the courts have occasionally looked with a kindly eye upon the rights of subtenants in possession, as is very fully brought out in the
interesting note of Judge Arnold to the principal case.
In Grider v. McIntyre, szra, upon which the lower court
relied in reaching a decision in the principal case, it appeared
that upon a demand for security for the payment of the rent
the original tenant surrendered the premises before the expiration of the lease, having previously sub-let them to the plaintiff
for a period which had not yet expired. The sub-tenant tendered security, as required by the act, which was refused by
the landlord. It was held that the original tenant could not
waive any legal right to the prejudice of the sub-tenant; citing
the case of Pleasant v. Benson, 14 E. 234, and Brown v. Butler, 17 Leg. Int. 148, a sub-tenant was held to have the right
to protection in the exercise of his privilege under the Act of
I825, and the landlotrd could not complain, because his rent
is secured, and the object for which the act was passed was
attained, even by the act of a party who, although a stranger
to the landlord, had contracted with his tenant and thus
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entitled himself to legal protection as against the unauthorized
acts of the original lessee. Grider v. Mcintyre is certainly
overruled by the decision of Shermer v. Paciello, and the profession and public should be very thankful that such an important question of landlord and tenant law has been decided in
such a satisfactory manner. It had always been popularly
supposed that the sub-tenant, when unrecognized, had absolutely no status as against the landlord, and real estate agents
had -constantly proceeded upon the basis of the doctrine
enunciated in Shermer v. Paciello.

